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Abstract
Fisheries management has traditionally been regulated through
governments which have vested ownership in natural resources. Despite
regulatory efforts, the common property nature of natural resources often
results in overcxploitation and destruction of otherwise renewable
resources. Fisheries worldwide have experienced declines in landed
volumes and fisheries managers have looked to alternative management
approaches to stem the tide of unsustainable use. Natural resource
exploitation has shown examples of sustainable use through long enduring
institutions, which depend on the resource user at the local level to
husband local resources. The particular problems that plague fisheries are
explored and successful and unsuccessful co-management regimes are
examined. The role of government in fisheries policy formulation is
examined in the context of Canadian fisheries management with a case
study analysis of a lobster co-management initiative on the Eastport
Peninsula.
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Chapter I
1.1 Introduction
Fisheries are natural resources that are often pursued competi tively by
resource users, which can lead to eventual cverexploitat ion. l eaving fish in
the water to catch another day does not make sense if there is no guarantee
that the fish will not be taken by another fisherman. This is the situation for
all open access natural resources that are regarded as "common property" .
Assigning private property rights appears to be a swift solution to avert the
"tragedy of the commons" but our limited experience of this property
regime or any property regime suggests it does not resolve the dilemma of
common property resources. What type of managemen t regimes and
owners hip rights lead to sustaina ble utilization of natural resources? This
paper examines institutional arrangements under which natural resource
sustainability has been achieved through management process which allows
for user involvement in decision makin g and recognition of the right to
organize at the local level. These regimes are reflected in long enduring
institutions that provide guiding principles for natural resource
management. The problems that plague fisheries management are
examined and the underutilzation of human capital in fisheries mana gement
is identified as a problem area for fisheries management. The sharing of
decision making powers in co-management regimes means that fishermen
actively participate in the management process. Their knowledge of local
resources both human and ecological provides the basis on which decisions
are made and choices are influenced. Who better to decide the type of
management arrangement than the resource user in co-operation with the
resource protector?
Can any management regime successfully achieve the goal of resource
sustalnabllity? This paper explores three co-management arrangements and
identifies the factors contributing to the success or failure of each situat ion.
A case study of a new co-management initiative in lobster management in
Newfoundland is analyzed to compare its characteristics to long enduring
resource management regimes identified by Ostrom (1990).
Chap ter n · Literature Review
2.1 Current and Alternative Management Approaches
A review of the state of world fisheries in 1994, by the Food and
Agriculture: Organization of the United Nations (FAG) showed that the
average rate of increase of world fisheries production had significantly
decreased since 19S0 and was approaching zero indicating that maximum
production of world fishing resources had been reached. In its latest report
on the state of world fisheries the situation for marine resources has not
improved (FAO 1997). In order to reverse the current trend and return
resources that are below peakproduction up to historical levels there is an
"urgent need for effective measures to control and reduce fishing capacity
and effort" (FAG 1997p.4S). The FAO attributes overfishing to excess fleet
capacity and inappropriate policy planning and management initiatives and
calls for a more precautionary approach to fisheries management (FAO
1997 p.23). Considering the degree of regulatory control and the use of
science and other technologies in fisheries management, developed
countries such as Canada should be excluded from this trend analysis, but
alas Canada is singled out in the FAO report as attaining "only a small
fraction of earlier production values" due to a moratorium on cod
barvesting (FAO 1997 p.80).
Fluctuations in natural ecosystems that result in the "boom and bust"
character of fisheries described by Caddy and Gulland (1983) have been
problematic for those trying to earn a living from the resource as well as for
those tasked with resource management. Traditional fisheries management
emphasizes a quantitative approach based on stock assessments and single
species models. The flaw in this management approach is that maximum
susta inable yield cannot be determined until it is surpassed and overfishing
is usually not detected until it is quite severe (Hilborn and Walters 1992).
Fisheries worldwide have experienced boom periods followed by declines
or complete failures as evidenced by the collapse of the Peruvian anchovy
fishery and the North Sea herring and the complete destruction of the
California sardine fishery (LUdwig et al. 1993; Hilborn and Walters 1992).
Closer to home, the collapse of Atlantic groundfish stocks and the resulting
moratoria in 1992 and 1993 have created calls for better management of
marine resources (Canada. 1998). Alternative management regimes which
direct efforts at multiple species and ecosystem approaches address the
information problem "by attempting to manage small areas of ocean which
are known intimately and scaled appropriately to biological processes"
(Wilson et al. 1994 p. 305). This different approach to management requites
a layered or hierarchical management structure which incorporates
decen tralization and community based governance (Wilson et aI. 1994).
The search for alternative management systems has led researchers like
Ludwig to critique management systems and view natural resource
management from a different perspective . Ludwig et al. (1993 p.547) states:
..It is more appropriate to think of resources as managing humans than the
converse: the larger and the more immediate are prospects for gain. the
greater the political power that is used to facilitate unlimited exploitation."
The authors argue that more effective management of resources is needed to
prevent the over-exploitation of the past particularly in reference to
fisheries. They echo the FAO in calling for a more cautious approach to
resource exploitation and suggest that management should include human
motivation and responses as part.of the system to be studied and managed.
Furthermore they suggest that scientists should be called upon to recognize
problems but not to solve them.
2.2 Fisheries Management Objectives
A fundamental approach to fisheries management is to manage marine
resources for the benefit of mankind. which results in various, and often-
conflicting management objectives. The management objectives are drawn
from four broad areas: biological, economic, recreational and social
(Hilborn and Walters 1992). These overlapping areas are intertwined and
interdependent as early research by economists Scott and Gordon
demonstrate.
An attempt to integrate the biology of commercial species with the
economic realities that characterize the fishing industry was first proposed
by Gordon in 1954. He proposed "that the ultimate question is not the
ecology of life in the sea as such. but man's use of these resources for his
own (economic) purposes". The central theme of Gordon 's argument was
that "on the whole, biologists tend to treat the fishennen as an exogenous
element in their analytical model, and the behavior of fishermen is not made
into an integrated element of a general and systematic "bionomic theory"
(Gordon 1954 p. 128). Gordon maintained that "practically all control
measures have, in the past, been designed by biologists, with sale attention
paid to the production side of the problem and none to the cost side"
(Gordon 1954 p.l32). He pointed out that the fishery is included among me
natural resources that areheld in common and exploited under conditions of
individualistic competition and that (Gordon 1954 p. 135):
Tbereappears.then.to besome truth in the conservative
dictum that everybody' s property is nobody' s property.
Wealththat is free for all is valued by none because he
who is foolhardy enough to wait for its proper time of
uscwill only find that it hasbeentaken by another.....the
fish in the sea arc valueless to the fishennan, because
there is no assurance that they will be there for him
tomorrow if they arc left behind today.•...Common-
property natural resources arc free goods for the
individual and scarce goods for society. Under
unregulated private exploitation, they can yield no rent;
that can be accomplished only by methods which make
them private or public (govcmment) property. in either
case subject to a unified directing power."
Scott (1955) developed the argument for sole ownership of fishery
resources to overcome Gordon's (1954) observation that "everybody' s
property is nobody 's property." Scott contended that no one would take the
trouble to husband a resource unless he had some reasonable certainty of
receiving some benefit from his efforts. "Yet the mere existence of the
institution of private property is not sufficient to ensure the efficient
management of natural resources; the property must be allocated on a scale
sufficient to insure that one management unit has complete control of the
asset" (Scott 1955 p. 116). Some assets such as fisheries occur on an
immense scale and "it is a very real problem to know whether the efficiency
gained from unified management provides a social gain sufficient to offset
the possible danger of some immense sole ownershipI organization (such as
a co-operative. a government board. a private corporation or an
international authority)" (Scott 1955 p. 116).
Although the early works of Gordon and Scott set a new course for
fisheries management it was Garren Hardin's (1968) article on the human
population crisis that popularized the notion of the "tragedy of the
commons". Feeny et al. (1990) noted that Hardin's (1968) "tragedy of the
common's" model has been used as a "metaphor of common-property
resource management" (Feeny et al. 1990 p.2). The phrase lhe tragedy of
the commons" has become the descriptor of the: situation that plagues
fisheries the world over. Gordon's observation on the futility ofleaving fish
(or other resources) for tomorrow without guarantee that it will be there is
not advantageous to the individual and leads to over exploitation of natural
resources. Despite misgivings both Gordon and Scott argued that a unified
body responsible for management of the common resource was necessary to
I SCoII defme, soleownenbi p asmecomplete Ippropriation of all DUlIn1 raourca in I
panicu1arlocationor specificto one owner and states explic itly that he is DOt referring to
monopoly .
avert a "tra gedy of the commons" be it either by private or public
ownership of'resources (Gordon 1954; Scotl19S S).
2.3 Common Property Resources
Common property resources share two characteristics that dictate
management options. The first relates to the problem of exclusion of
potential users, which is complicated by the physical nature of the resource.
it may be too difficult or too costly to control access of potential users. The
second relates to the subtractability of the resource whereby each user
subtracts from the welfare of other users. It is this second feature of
common property resources that leads to a divergence between individual
and collective economic rationality of joint use (Gordon 1954). Thus
common property resources are resources for which exclusion is difficult
and joint use revolves around subtraetability (Berkes et a!. 1989).
Research on the social mechanisms of common property management has
shown that the tragedy of the commons is not necessarily a consequence of
common property management ( Berkes et al. 1989; Feeny et al. 1990;
McCay and lentoft 1996: Jentoft and Kristofferson 1989; Ruttan 1998;
Feeny et aI. 1996). Feeny et aI. (1996) argue that overexploitation in
fisheries is not exclusive to situations of common property as indicated by
the tragedy of the conunons model but on the contrary, successful long-term
resource management can be found under either communal, private, or slate
property regimes. Similarly Scott argued "that long-run considerations of
efficiency suggest that sole ownership is a much superior regime to
competition but that in the short run in the ordinary case there is little
difference between the efficiency of common and of private property"
(Scott 1955 p.117). Ostrom's (1990) research into long-standing common
property management regimes highlights institutions that have withstood
the test of time for resource users. Her analysis of centuries old institutions
includes land and forest tenure in Switzerland and Japan and irrigation
systems in Spain and the Philippines.
Bromley (1992 p.4) argues that there is "no such thing as a common
property resource; there are only resources controlled and managed as
common property, or as slate property, or as private property". The
confusion exists over resources to which no property rights are recognized
and where open access to the resource occurs. These "open access
resources" are subject to overexploitation whenever the benefits of
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obtaining them are greater thanthe costs (Ostro m 1992) . Ostrom argues that
when property rights exist whether they are private. state or common rights
the costs and benefits of mana ging the resource will determin e the degree of
overexplo itation and destruction to the resourc e.
Ostrom uses the term common poo l resources to descri be natural and man-
made resourc es that are large enough "to make it costly (but not impo ssib le)
to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from its use"
(Ostrom 1990 p.30). Conunon pool resource s are used by indiv idua ls in
common and require self-governance and institut ional arrangements to
ensure resource sustainability .
Private or public property regimes identified by Gordo n (1954) as rent
generat ors for the resource, the sole ownership organ ization to which Scott
(1955) referred and the "tragedy of the commons" situat ion which Hard in
(1969) pop ularize d are organize d by Berkes et al. ( 1989) into one of four
basic property regimes . The first regime is open access where there is an
absence of well-defined property rights and the resource is free and open to
all as with fisheries of the past. Hardin (1968) used the analogy of free
pasture where it is advantageous for each individual herder to add more and
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more animals until the pasture is overgrazed and all herders suffer the
consequence of overexploitation. The second regime is the private property
situation where an individual or a corporation has the right to exclude others
from using the resource. The third situation is communal property where the
resource is held by an identifiable community of users who can exclude
others and regulate the resource use for themselves. The fourth situation is
state governance whereby the government has exclusive rights to the
resource and regulates access and exploitation. The authors give examples
of successes and failures under each ownership regime to argue that
privatization or government control are not the only institutional
arrangements for natural resource management and that these regimes do
not necessarily ensure resource sustainability.
2.4 Common Property Management Institutions
The present state of world fisheries reported by the FAO and the current
situation of Canadian fisheries particularly on the East Coast points to the
need to include human motivation and responses in fisheries management
as arguedby Ludwig et aI. (1993).
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Ostrom (1990 ) identified seven characteristics as essential elements or
conditions of the design principles in common pool resource (CPR)
institutions that contribute to the successful management of the resource.
Her principles draw heavily on humaninteraction from a social perspective
as well as the interaction of humans with the local conditions and
environment.
Desigo princ iples illustrated by long enduring CPR institutioos:
(Ostrom 1990)
I . Clearly defined boundaries.
Individualsor households who have rights (0 withdrawresource
units}from the CPR must be clearly defined. as must boundari es of
theCRP itself.
2. Congruencebetween appropriationandprovision roles and local
conditions.
Appropriate roles restricting time,place. tce:hnology, and/or quantity
of resourceunits arerelatedto localconditions andto provision rules
requiring labor, material, and/or money.
3. Collective-ebciee arrangements.
Most individualsaffectedby theoperational rules can participate in
modifying the operationalroles.
4, Monitoring.
Monitors, whoactively audit CPRconditions and appropriate
behavior, are accountable to theappropriators) or arc the
appropriators.
S, Graduated sanctions.
Appropriators who violate operationalrules arc likely to beassessed
graduated sanctions(depending on the seriousnessof the offense) by
other appropriators, by officialsaccountable to theseappropriators.
or by both,
1~ units are wlw individualsapptO'pria1eorU$C &omthe raoum: systml Le. tons of (ISh,
cubic melCrS ofwata" or tons o(fodder (Oscrom 1990p.30).
I The prtlCC$I of witbchwin& l'eSOIlJ'tfI:units from diemow'« syskm isappropriationand those
who witbchw an:called appropriaton (Ostrom 1990p.30).
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6. Confliet-resolutionmcchani.sm.s.
Appropriatorsandtheirofficialshave rapid access to low-costarenas
to resolve conflicts among appropriators or between appropriators
and officials.
7. Minimal recognitionof rights to organize:.
The rightsof appropriatorsto devise theirO\ItTIinstitutions arenot
challenged by external government auth orities .
For CPRsthal QT~ Q part oflorger S)I$ '~m1:
8. Nested tntetprisest.
Appropriation.,provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict
resolution. and governanceactivities areorganized in multiple layers
ofoe stedeotcrprises.
CPR! arenotexclusive to fisheries but include a variety of natural resource
utilizations that can of course encompass fisheries management. The design
principles Ostromhas defined relate to the actlvitles of people orchestrating
the exploitation of the resources. It is the mechanisms of people
management that she is observing rather than the mechanisms employed in
resource exploitation. This "human management" element in resource
exploitation is a variation on Ludwig et al.'s (1992) statement that it is more
appropriate to manage resources in terms of managing humans than the
convCf'$C.
• Nestedenterprisesan: multi-layem1institutionswbid! aretaskedwidl CPR managtrlltnL
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2.5 Fisheries Management
Ostrom (1990) has outlined the requirements of success for any common
pool resource but particular problems are associated with fisheries.
Pinkerton and Weinstein (1995) observed that fisheries management is
fraught with problems that can be attributed to the fact that management
agencies manage fish but not people, yet the principal way fisheries are
managed is by regulating the activities of human harvesters. the fishermen.
By analyzing case studies from fisheries around the world the autnors
identified nine sociopolitical problems associated with a failure of fisheries
management to achieve the goals of sustainable fisheries.
The nine sociopolitical problems of fisheries identified by Pinkerton and
Weinstein (1995) are:
1) the problem or undervaluing or ignoring human capital
Human capital or social capital is the problem solving capabilities
that societies have developed over time and is the basis of turning
resources into capital. In the fisheries context it is the knowledge and
skills of the fishermen that are often localized and unrecorded about
the behavior of fish populations and the local environment.
Fishermen may also be in the position to construct plausible
hypotheses about observations on fish disappearance based on local
history that is not available to the research scientist.
IS
1) confu sing public policy Ipa blic values witb the interest! of a
few powerful acton
Lobbying by advisory committees to policy makers may not be in
the best interest of communities, fishermen or the health of the
stocks .
3) down load ing tbe cosh of flsh bab itat pr otection to the fllh ing
communities a nd the public
Often the cost of fish habitat and pollution is passed on to the loca l
level as there is insufficicnt public policy to make those responsible
pick up the tab of these costs.
4) compliance/enforcement pr oblems
Some fishermen obey the rules because it is lawful to do so while
others follow regulations to greater or lesser degrees in proportion to
how legitimate they consider the regulation to be. While there are
some fishermen who disobey regulations regardless of the quality of
the regulation, this group will be less tolerated by law-abiding
fishermen who support regulations that are important ( 0 the welfare
and future of the fishery.
5) too man y bie aDd powerful boa U
The tendency of fishermen to over- invest makes them more
suscepti ble to fluctuations in abundance making fishing effort more
difficult to contro l. Communities that regulate their inshore, near
shore or river fisheries have instituted rules that address fishing
effort. There is less of a tendency to over-invest due to equitable
access and equitable economic return.
6) defining boundaries and acceu: the exclusion problem
"
Exclusion is necessary for local communities to make ru les and
enforce them. The right to fish may be defined by state laws or by
well-de fined soc ial roles and may include outs iders or non-residen ts.
Some formof exclusion makes it easier to capture hwnan capital and
members are more willing to invest time and energy into enhan cing
local stocks or improving management efforts if they expect benefi ts
to remain in their own area.
7) ueeccrdieated stra tegies and usen
Conve ntiona l management often ends up being a tug of war betwee n
different divisions or departments (harvesting, enhancement,
plannin g). Ecosystem management means includeing species
interaction s and the impact of environmental conditions. At the local
level there is potential for conflict from neigh boring commun ities on
use and enhancemen t strategies .
8) lnter -gcvemmeetal conflid
Conflicts exist between federal and prov incial agencies over
j urisdiction and management of natural resource use . Econom ic
interests in timber and energy may create power struggles between
provincial agenc ies pitting economi c interests against environmental
concerns.
9) supply managem ent, product quality aDd produc t diversity.
The price that fishermen receive for their catc h is influenced by
market conditions of supply and demand, freshness and qua lity, and
product form. The ability of communiti es and fisherm en' s
organizati ons to influence these factors has implications on the
stabi lity and sustaina ble mana gement of the fish resources .
11
Ostrom (1990) defines social mechanisms which allow sustainable
exploitation of resources while Pinkerton and Weinstein (1995) identify the
lack of human capital in fisheries management regimes as the major
element which has contributed to the unsustainable fisheries situation
reported by the FAO. Although fisheries management is burdened with
many problems there appears to be a lack of inclusion of the fisherm en in
the management process, which leads to human capital deficit.
18
Cha pter III Background of Co-management
3.1 Co-management Regimes
The management alternative that addresses the exclusion of user
participation is co-operative management or co-management. Fisheries co-
management is looked upon as an alternative to existing management
regimes, but it is not a panacea for all the woes associated with the present
system of government-dominated. top-down management (Jentoft 1989;
Jentoft and McCay 1995; Kearney 1981). Co-management regimes include
government and user groups in the decision-making process. The National
Round Table on the Environment and the Economy NRTEE5 stated in its
report on Oceans that co-management is an arrangement between
government and another group where roles may differ between the partners
but an "acknowledgment of investment of resources and the joint sharing of
authority distinguishes co-management from other forms of discussion or
consultation" (Canadaj, 1998 p. l3). Sen and Nielson (1996) utilized case
studies and literature reviews to classify co-management arrangements into
five broad types according to the role taken by government and user groups.
I NRTEEholdspublicconsultation mC1:tings throughout the country on issues relating to
sustainable economic development.NRTEEWII5 establishedby the Goycmmenl of Canada in
1988 and itsmembersarc drawn fromgoycmmcnl agencies and Indusry.
19
The arrangements vary from instructive. consultative. co-operative.
advisory, and informative. Instructive and consultative management is
management by governments whereby industry acts on the decisions made
by the government authority. Advisory and informative management has
industry making decisions on fishery management with government
acquiescing to industry decisions. Co-operative arrangements have
government and industry jointly making management decisions that affect
the fishery. Co-management is distinguished from community-based
management and traditional marine tenure systems by the exclusion of
government from the decision-making process of these regimes (Sen and
Nielson 1996).
Likewise Jentoft and McCay (1995) describe user participation in fisheries
on a continuum scale of which government-industry interaction can take
many forms. They found no one prescriptive of institutional design for co-
management regimes. Co-management arrangements between governments
and industry can take many forms and the degree of user participation
varies by country. In a review of fourteen countries in the Western
Hemisphere the authors found that the institutional arrangements fell
between the two extremes of government control and fishermen control. All
20
countries display institutional arrangements of government (or other
agencies) and user groups which collaborate on the design and
implementation of management systems but the type of arrangements
reflects the institutional patterns and practices prevalent in the particular
country. Consequently the authors argue that there is little mutual learning
between countries. but there are opportunities for transferring design
principles from one country to another. particularly on the issue of
participatory democracy whereby they observe that the larger the
organization. the more difficult it is to maintain a democratic process based
on direct participation.
3.2 Examples of Co-management Success and Failure
The longest running co-management regimes. found in Norway (LoCoten
Islands) and Japanare similar in that both have a legal basis on which the
institutional structure is designed but the rationale for forming and the
institutional structures differ. The Japanese system was born out of
economic pressure and social conflict in the early 19th century whereas the
Lofoten Islands regime was developed to address crowding and gear
conflictson fishinggrounds(lim et at. 1995).
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3.21 Norway (Lofoten Islands)
The cod fisheryaCthe Lofoten Islands is found southwest of the Norwegian
mainland and has been co-managed for close to a hundred years. Migratory
cod (Gadw mo,.hua)arrives at the coast of Norway from the Barents Sea to
spawn during the winter and spring . These migratory aggregations of cod
have for centuries provided an abundant and rich harvest. Fishermen from
the northern and southern areas of Norway congregate in Lcfoten to harvest
cod using an array of fishing gear, which often causes conflicts on the
fishing grounds. The regulatory system for gear use was born out of
conflicts extending from the 19th century when regulations specifically
designed to reduce conflict proved to be ineffect ive. By 1890 fishermen
were dissatisfied with the regulation of the fishery and demanded changes
whereby they could manage the fishery themselves. A new Jaw was written
in consultation with the fishermen and represented an entirely new system
in fishery legislation. Instead of prescribing rules for execution of the
fishery as did previous laws, the Lofoten Law of 1897 established principles
for the organization of fishenn en to establish rules of conduct for the
fishery. These rules of co-management dominate the regulatory system in
Norway's fishery today. The boundary for the fishery has been stable over
the years and each gear type is restricted to Its own field, which has been
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determined by a committee. Skippers serve as inspectors for regulation
adherence and as ombudsmen for conflict resolution. Individual fishermen
can appeal field size to their elected members and decisions are voted upon
by the committee. Committee meetings are called within one week and if
changes pass committee vote they are executed within two days. It is
interesting to note that access hasnever been limited in the Lofoten fishery .
Any fisherman who wants to fish has had the opportunity to do so although
the amount and type of gear may be limited. The Lofoten fishermen SUPPOt1
free access and equal distribution of opportunities. The success of the co-
management system at Lofoten is in its endurance and continuing survival
(Jentoft and Kristofferson 1989). The legislation governing the co-
management of the Lofbten Island fishery governs the conduct of the
fishermen within their organization and the fishermen are left to their own
devices on how to manage access to the resource. There is no exclusion of
any fishermen but as each is added to the particular gear sector the
substractabillty issue comes into play. An interesting point about this co-
management system is that it governs a migratory rather that a sedentary
species.
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3.22 Japan
Ostrom (1990) describes the ancient land and forest tenure systems of
Japan which are included in the CPRs design principles. Lim et al. (1992)
provide a descriptive of fishery co-operatives that emerged in the early 19th
century from a feudal system with exclusive use and hereditary rights.
Management functions of the fishery were administered by village guilds
which administered the fisheries regulations and other economic activities.
Numerous disputes over fishing rights and gear usage as well as other
matters forced the government to enact legislation to improve productivity
and democratization of fisheries. The Japanese government enacted the
Fisheries Cooperative Association Law in 1948 and the Fisheries l aw of
1949 to promote fishery productivity and grant fishery rights. Fishery
Cooperative Associations (FCAs) are granted property rights that they
extend to their members. This system of fishery rights and licensing
evolved to protect coastal fisheries from encroachment by other economic
sectors. While the Fisheries Cooperative Associations are engaged in
business activities of granting credit, marketing and support services, the
activities are not profit driven but are intended to promote the
socioeconomic condition of fishermen and processors. A further level of
government exists in the form of commissions to oversee the democratic
24
implementation of fishery rights and licenses. The commissioners are both
elected and appointed officials who represent fisheries expertise and public
interest. The main function of the board is to develop fishing ground plans,
evaluate qualifications of right holders, provide advice to local government
on living aquatic resources and resolve conflicts (Ruddle 1987 cited in Lim
er al. 1995). The Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery has the right
to dissolve the board if it violates laws or is unjust in its operation.
Interaction between all levels of governments l.e. FCAs, municipal,
prefecture and federal is multiple and complex and close interaction
between all levels occurs in the formation and implementation of
management plans, fishery projects, budgets. and subsidies. The system's
continued success depends on the active involvement of both fishermen and
government as well as on underlying factors of conflict avoidance,
compliance behavior. and cultural values of collective action and
participatory decision-making (Lim et aI. 1995).
3.23 Canada (Nova Scotia)
Kearney (1981) reports on a co-management scheme for fisheries that did
not work. In response to a new fishery policy in 1976 the government of
Canada initiated a number of changes to improve the earnings of the purse
"
seine herring fishennen in the Bay of Fundy. This fishery was developed to
supply fish meal with correspo nding tow prices paid to fishermen. The
fishermen were in competition with each other to land as much volume as
possible resu lting in process ing gluts and underu tilization in the processing
sector. The government banned the use of herring for fishmeal, provided
loans and grants to processors to increase processing capacity and worked
closely with the fishermen to improve their marketing method s. Fleet
quotas , weekly quotas and ever- the-side sales and logbook records led to
better processing and monitoring of the product. Although industry and
government worked together to develop the fishery the system fell apart in
1980 through a combination of environmental , social and economic factors.
The fishennen's marketing co-operati ve did not perform the marketing
function it was supposed to and individual fishermen made individua l
marketing arrangements with processors resulting in large-sca le under-
reportin g of catches. At the time of crisis in 1980 the fishermen 's co-op did
not have the authority to deal with the situation and the government did not
respond quickly enough to the changing circumstances. Kearney does not
elaborate on conflict resolution mechanisms of the agreement but he implies
that the desire to change the purse seine fishery was more of an initiative of
governmen t than of fishermen .
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3.3 The Role of Govemmen t
According to Dyer and McGoodwin (1994) all fisheries management
regimes must address two fundamental and problems: first how to conserve
marine resources and second how to fairly and equitably proportion
resources to fish harvesters. While the first problem is in the realm of
marine biology the second problem lies in the disciplines of economics and
social science. Paramount to any action by biologists, economists or
sociologists is the impact of harvesting on the resource, by the harvester.
Furthermore fishermen belong to communities and as such. participate in
making policies and by-laws for protecting society and promoting orderly
and wise use of the society's resource. Yet few fishermen are involved in
devising fishing regulations and policies which serve the public good and
the good of the fishing community (Pinkerton and Weinstein 1995).
The compliance of fishermen to regulations and the activities of fishermen
that affect resource conservation are important from enforcement and
conservation perspectives. The state has the means to ensure a high level of
regulation compliance but in the days of shrinking budgets and staff
shortages other approaches may be more cost effective and more socially
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acceptable. Succ essful management schemes get fishermen to vo lun tari ly
advance their collective interests at the expense of private ones but in order
for th is to happen regu lations must have legiti macy . That is, fishermen wi ll
acce pt the regu lations as appropriate and consistent with thei r own values
and co mpliance to regulations will be high. High compliance to regulations
ensures that management efforts will be met with success (Jentoff 1989).
As we have pointed out very few fisheries are manag ed for the benefit of
the fish but are instead managed for the benefit of man . As noted above
fisheries management object ives are group ed into four general and often
co nflicting areas : biological , economic, recreation al and socia l. Fisheries
may be mana ged for one or more of these objec tives but invariably
tradeoffs occur between these areas . This is not to say that governments are
insensi tive to the human element of fishery mana gement as the follo wing
quote from a Canadian government reportshows (Canada 1976 p.S) :
Although commercial fishing has long been a
highly regulated activity in Canada, the object of
regulation has, with rare exception, been the
protection of renewable resource. In other words,
fishing bas been regulated in the interest of the
fish. In the future it is to be regulated in the
interest of the people who depend on the fishing
industry . Implicit in the new orientation is more
direct intervention by government in controlling
the use of fishery resources, from the water to the
table, andalso more direct participation by the
"
people affected in the formulation and
implementation of fishery policy.
The redirection of management efforts in 1976 was precipitated by a crisis
in the commercial fishing industry particularly in eastern Canada with the
recognition that the fishing industry .. failed to yield to its participants the
kind of reward that similar effort yields in other occupations" (Canada L976
p. 1). Kearney (1981) argued that this change in management policy led to
the co-management effort in Nova Scotia's purse seine herring fishery.
While the government initiative did not produce the intended results a
valuable lesson may have been learned. In 1996, the Canadian government
proposed the "fisheries management partnering concept" which is contained
in the proposed New Fisheries Act Bill C~2. Partnering is intended to
"build upon and extend our existing co-management approach. It will
provide for a more participatory, efficient and effective Fisheries
Management regime" (Canadae 1996 p.1-2). The National Round Table on
the Environment and the Economy Report (Canadaj 1998) states that a
fundamental shift in the relationship between government and resource
users is needed to blend ecological, economic and social goals concerning
ocean management. It recognizes that: "Co-management uses sustainable
development, integrated management, and the precautionary approach to
"
encourage more comprehensive ocean management by a broader base of
stakeholders ." (Canada, 1998 p.xiv).
Arguably fisberies management cannot be viewed as merely an exercise in
fisheries biology but as an integral part of societal objectives and functions.
and co-management of fisheries is an opportunity for greater user inclusion
in management processes. This shift in policy raises the question of how to
encourage user participation in management issues and bow to create
successful co-management regimes. Such changes in policy also indicate
that some management decisions will no longer be the exclusive duty of
the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans. The partnering concept promotes the
sharing of regulatory authority with aboriginal and local groups. An
example of co-management between First Nations and the Government of
Canada followed the 1990 Supreme Court decision on aboriginal fishing
rights known as the "Sparrow decision". The federal government developed
the "Aborigina1 Fishing Strategy" which included provisions for
cooperative management projects. The subsequent agreements have resulted
in more stable relations between government and aboriginals as well as
improved management of the resource. "Capacity building" and improved
economic benefits to often times remote aboriginal communities are
paybacks to self-management initiatives (McCorquodale 1996). The present
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is a time in which fishery co-management initiatives by local groups are
likely to be met with encouragement by regulatory authorities. but
subsequent enabling legislation for power sharing arrangements may prove
to be more elusive. Pomeroy and Berkes (1997) maintain that enabling
legislation which defines roles for the co-management parties and
determines the degree of decentralized government authority is essential for
successful co-management regimes.
The following case study of the Eastport lobster fishery demonstrates that
the sharing of management responsibilities is an alternative management
option that addresses the government's concern about resource
sustainability while at the same time encompasses the concerns of local
fishermen. The husbandry responsibilities related to resource management
have been undertaken by the local fishermen and the recognition of their
efforts has been instituted in a eo-management arrangement with the
Canadian government
1I
Cha pter IV Case Study
4.1 Background of Eastport Project
The Eastport Peninsula is located in the central part of Bonavista Bay
adjacent to Terra Nova National Park. The Park separates the peninsula
from the mainland but the park boundary ends at the low tide mark. The
fisbermen in the area legally fish for lobster in waters adjacent to the park.
The Eastport Peninsula is included in Area 5 of the Lobster Fishing Areas
(LFA) as designated by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO)
which includes all of Bonavista Bay from Cape Freels in the north to Cape
Bonavista in the south .
Fluctuations have occurred in Newfound land lobster catches over the past
few decades but a complete closure of the fishery for three years from
1925·27 , shows that the stock is sensitive to over exploi tation and
environmental factors (Templeman 1941). In recent years Newfound land
catches declined stead ily from the 1950' s with an unexpected reversal of
the downward trend in the 1970's . An all time low in 1972 was followed by
a two- fold increase in landings in 1979. Catches in 1992 were the highest
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since 1905. followed by declining landings in recent years. The severity of
declining trends is greater in some areas than in other areas (Ennis er aI.
1997).
4.2 Rationale
In 1993 the lobster fishermen on the Eastport peninsula experienced the
lowest catches on record. The moratorium on cod was announced in the
previous year and as a result fishermen turned to the lobster fishery to
supplement their incomes. Previously this group of approximately fifty
fishennen had more lucrative opportunities in the cod fishery and fished
lobster for shorter periods. However with more time on their hands the extra
effort that has to be put in at the end of the season when lobster are
traditionally more difficult to catch was worth it
The Eastport Lobster Protection Committee (EPLPC) on the Eastport
Peninsula was formed in 1994 to address the declining resource and the
threat to livelihoods. At the same time information about Marine
13
Conservation Areas. an initiative from Parks Canada6• became available
and the information was brought back to the local fishery committee
meetings. On the issue of conservation the fishermen identified the
harvesting of undersized lobster as a problem area to which fishermen
themselves were contributing. From the beginning it was apparent that the
majority of fishermen favored the idea of stopping undersized lobster
catches and closing some areas to fishing. The Fisheries Resource
Conservation Council (FRCC) published a report on the state of lobster
stocks in Canada that identified v-nctching7 of egg bearing females as a
means to increase the egg per recruit ratio as a sustainable management
practice. The EPLPC considered the recommendations contained in the
FRe C' s report and entertained a program of v-notching to boost egg
production as a means of resource sustainability.
The Eastport Lobster Protection Committee was formed to focus attention
and effort on conservation measures for the purpose of sustainability.
Although there was a substantial amount of support among the local
fishermen. during the initial stages some skepticism remained.
• Pvks Canada has identifiedBoaavistaand Nonre Dame Bays as . PfOSpective Marine
Conservation ArI:a. Such lias m mlUlaged for susuinable IIIe with sm&ller arus set aside as
prottetedorclosedmu.
4.3 Monitoring
Fishermen knew that taking undersized lobster for local sale and
consumption was destroying the resource and agreed that the practice of
taking undersized lobster should be stopped. However they did not want to
be burdened with the role of enforcer. Instead they decided to promote a
program of "monitoring". All fishermen would be monitored by other
fishermen who would report any infractions to the committee. The
committee would then approach the non-complying fishermen directly
about their activities and the impact of their actions on the livelihoods of
other fishermen. This approach was direct and above board and would not
alienate the reporter from the offender. If the offender continued to threaten
the livelihood of fishermen by disregarding the regulations then the
committee would report the infractions to DFO. To reinforce the
commitment of the EPLPC to stopping the harvest of undersized lobster
DFO was asked at public meetings to randomly check lobster holding vats
on the peninsula throughout the season. All the lobster fishermen on the
peninsula were aware of the request for random vat checks by DFO and if
caught with illegal lobster they would "lose face" with their peers.
7 V-notching of lobster isa voluntaryconservationmethod whereby fishermenput a notch in me
shell of egg-bearingfemalesand return them to the water. If v-eotched lobster are caughtthe next
lS
The problem of poaching lobster by non-fishermen was more difficult for
the committee to address as these activities tend to occur at times when the
fishermen are not fishing: either at night. on weekends or during closed
seasons. Although the f ishermen may observe the results of non-fisher
poaching on the fishing grounds by the scarcity of catch, the enforcement
responsibility for non-fishers is beyond the scope of the committee.
4.4 Exclusion of Outsiden and Defining Boundaries
To protect the livelihoods of the fishermen on the Eastport Peninsula the
committee decided that they had to protect the resource from "outsiders".
The lobster resource on the peninsula could be improved by the action of
the local fishermen but they would not reap these benefits unless they could
protect the resource from fishermen who had the legal right to fish in all
waters of LFA 5. Such an exclusion order would require the sanction of
DFO as well as the agreement of all f ishermen affected by the exclusion
order.
The ELPC organized meetings to the north and south of the Eastport
Peninsula to garner support for their exclusion zone. The fishermen
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considered where fishermen on the peninsula traditionally fished and where
neighboring fishermen from St. Brendan's and Glovenown traditionally
fished. With the co-operation and consent of the fishermen from these
communities and the other fishermen in LFA S. the committee drew up
boundaries around the peninsula which would exclude neighboring
communities. The fishers on the peninsula gave up the right to fish outside
of the boundary and those outside agreed not to fish within the boundary. A
buffer zone between the outer boundary and the inner boundary is an area
where both "outsiders" and peninsula fishermen can fish. Any fishermen
that traditionally fished these buffer areas before the committee formed can
continue to fish there. OFO supported the exclusion zone proposed by the
EPLPC and incorporated the fishing zone exclusion into the license
conditions for LFAS. Fishermen in LFA S who are not residents of Eastport
have a license condition that prevents them from fishing in the inner zone
(Refer to Appendix IA). Resident lobster fishermen on the Eastpon
Peninsula have conditions attached to their licenses that restrict their fishing
activity to the inner zone of LFA S (Refer to Appendix 1B). Both groups of
fishennen can fish in the buffer zone between the outer and inner areas.
This exclusion order became the basis for the Memorandum of Agreement
for the 1997 Eastport lobster fishery (Refer to Appendix II). This initial
J7
agreement was structured as a pilot project between the local committee and
DFO for the 1997 season.
The closed areas around Round IslandS and Duck Island were chosen on the
criteria that they had good bottom habitat for lobster, had shown good catch
rates in the past and had shown evidence of mature and juvenile lobster .
The areas were also chosen on the basis that few fishermen fished these
areas. Additionally the closed areas also had to be highly visible to
compliment the monitoring program. Initially, the fishenne n analyzed the
areas in light of how many fishermen fished in the area and the number of
pots that would be displaced from the closed area to the remaining ground .
4.5 Incorporation of Local Knowledge
Enviro nmental cond itions such as bottom type, currents, historical catches
and the presence of large lobster were important eco logical factors which
were considered as these closed areas would be the main egg production
zones to replenish the stock. The displacement of fishennen from the
"Rowld IslaDdlies wiUtillTan Nova NatioDaJ ParkbouDdaria andill effect itswaren have
become _ proteaed areawithin I lIItiooaIpart..
"
closed area was also a pivotal issue and those that were displaced from the
closed areas were supporters of the fledgling committee's initial efforts .
The effort to leave undersized lobster in 1995 was paying off by 1996 when
catch rates hit a record high by Eastport Peninsula fishermen (Warrena
1998). By 1997 the Eastport Lobster Protect ion Committe e was well
estab lished and although 1997 catches were lower due to v-notch lng lobster
in the previous year, support for the committee was growing. Fortunately in
the first year of the comm ittee 's operation lobster catches improved and the
support for the committee grew. [0 the early stages of its work the
committee realized that the anecdotal information they had concerni ng
lobster movemen t and the suitability of the closed areas for a lobster
sanctuary needed to be substantiated by a scientifically based research
initiativ e. They also knew that in recent years DFO hasbeen subjected to
bud get reductions and staff shortages. The comm ittee worke d closely with
DFO to draw on available resources from the area and to initiate lobster
research on the closed areas in addition to the logbook program that DFO
was alrea dy conducting.
"
4.6 Legal Recognition
For the 1998 lobster fishery a more extensive project proposal was
developed. The Joint Project Agreement contained in Appendix 1II is
between the government of Canada and the Food. Fisheries and Allied
Workers I Canadian Auto Workers (FFAW/CAW) Union Resource
Centre9. This agreement coven a period of five yean from 1998 to March
of 2003 and is a fonna11egal arrangement requiring the signature of a duly
incorporated body such as the FFAWtCAW Resource Centre. The Joint
Project Agreement specifies the roles that each party is to carry out in the
co-management of the Eastport lobster resource.
4.7 Local Resource Initiatives
The Eastport lobster fishennen were interested in the impact of the closed
areas on the population of lobster and the migration of lobster into and out
of the closed areas. But with the limited resources of DFO in recent years a
full-scale research project was not possible. However, Parks Canada was
interested in the project that wastaking place on its doorstep and within its
I The FFAW/CAWUnionrepresents inshorefisbmnm Illd establi$bedthe ~oorpontcd
F"lSbmnco's RcsourteCentm m 1 990 lO promou: locaI~lopmcnt proj«ts ~la!Cd to flSberics.
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boundary at Round Island. Subsequently, personnel from the Park as well as
research scientists from Memorial University of Newfoundland (MUN)
became involved in the project working closely with DFO and the EPLPC
to incorporate research on lobster movements from tagging studies. A
graduate student from Memorial has worked on the research project and in
1991 and 1998 collected data on lobster movement from tagging studies. In
1998 Parks Canada hired a summer student to collect and compile data on
the v-nctching efforts of local f ishermen.
DFO is responsible for the science component of the project at Eastport but
they work closely with Parks Canada and Memorial University. Parks
Canada provides accommodations. use of its facilities and equipment. and
support services for administration and field research while Memorial
University provides research support and personnel. Considerable personal
contributions in time and energy are donated by the committee chair.
committee members and personnel from MUN, OFO and Parks Canada.
These contributions by "outside" organizations no doubt contribute to the
high regard that committee members attribute to these agencies. The
committee members interviewed were unanimous in that they received
good support from local and regional OFO personnel.
..
It is difficult to attach dollar values to the contributions of time and effort
by the individuals and organizations involved in the project at Eastport.
Determining the labour cost required for v-norching a lobster or placing a
value on the time required to plan. attend and execute meeting agenda
objectives is an arduous task. Determining the value of the project outcomes
is equally difficult, as some objectives such as social benefits are difficult to
quantify. This may be why the Joint Project Agreement makes no reference
to cost sharing arrangements.
Under the project agreement DFO is tasked with the promotion of
conservation and protection activities of the area. To this end DFO has
worked with the local school to create a database from the fishermen's
logbooks (O'Leary 1997).
The fishermen who are listed in the Joint Project Agreement have the legal
right to fish within the innerboundaries of the Eastport Peninsula. However
the agreement has no provision for restricting the number of lobster
fishermen on the Eastport Peninsula. As with any other lobster fishing area
licenses can be transferred within the LFA. Eastport fishermen can still
obtain a license from anywhere in LFA 5 and fish within the Eastport area if
they live within the peninsula boundary . The committee was not set up to
limit other fishermen in the area from entering the lobster fishery but to
protect the resource and provide better incomes for Eastport fishermen.
While this may appear to be contradic tory, it was pointed out that the
committee's intent was not to discourage local fishermen from participating
in the fishery, the intent was to improve the condition of the lobster stocks
and keep the benefits of their efforts in the local area.
4.8 Resolving Conflict
At any one time three to nine fishermen sit on the committee and handle the
monitor reports from other fishermen. If unusual circumstances or situations
arise a general meeting of all lobster fishmnen is called to decide on the
course of action. Each fisherman is free to discuss the topic and if a vote is
taken each fisherman is entitled to vote. The level of agreement and co-
operation is high among the fishermen on the Eastport Peninsula and this
conflict resolution mechanism is effective. Participatory democracy of this
type works well for small groups of people and reflects a leadership style
that is open and democratic. The Joint Project Agreement is non-binding in
that either side can opt out of the agreement at any time.
4.9 Results
The EPLPC has collected two years of data ( 1997 and 1998) from the
logbook program. At the time of writing the figures for 1998 were not
analyzed; however initial reports show that some fishermen have had
increased catches by as much as fifty percent in 1998 (Warnen b 1998).
From discussions with fishermen. some reported an increase in catches in
1998 over 1997 despite a shorter season and the imposition of a size
increase on legal lobster by DFO in mid-season. Other fishermen fishing in
the buffer zone said that catches were about the same as always but there
were more pots in that area from licenses transferred from other
communities. These reports are insignificant from a statistical viewpoint
but they are significant for two other reasons. The first is that overall the
efforts of the EPLPC are not in vain. the resource is showing signs of
improvement Elsewhere in Bonavista Bay lobster catch rates were worse
than 00 the Eastport Peninsula (Warreob 1998). The second reason these
reports are significant is the increased fishing effort observed by local
fishermen in the buffer zone . Fishermen will fish where the catches are the
best perunit ofeffort, After four years of monitoring. the undersized lobster
that would otherwise have been removed in 1995. is now of legal size. The
foraging nature of lobster means that it will migrate over sho rt distanc es for
seasonal feeding and mating (Templeman 1938). Unlike the fishermen the
lobster are not restric ted to the a particu lar zone and the change in fish ing
pattern in the buffer zone may reflec t effort directed at a larger population
of legal sized lobster.
"
Ch apter V Concl usions
The essence of fisheries co-management is the sharing of power between
government and resource users. This definition implies that fishermen as
resource users will be included in the decision making process . Fishermen
will bring to the table their human capital and expertise on local resources.
Their knowledge of local resources includes historical catches , bathymetry ,
weather patterns, gear usage and the interactio n of fishermen with the
environment. Basica lly fishenne n know what works and what doesn ' t work
in the local area and how best to solve local dilemmas .
The most striking observation on the Eastport Lobster Protection
Committee is that this effort came from the fishermen themselves rather
than from governmen t. This observation is in stark contrast to the herring
seine fishery co-manag ement effort described by Kearney. The desire in
Eastport to protect the resource and increase the returns for fishermen is a
grass roots movement. The fishermen on the Eastport Peninsula know that
the issue at hand is how to use the lobster resources for their own economic
purpose and that they are not an exogenous element in fisheries
managemen t (Gordon 1955). The assurance that undersized lobster that are
put back in the system will be there for them next season when they have
grown and become more valuab le. is the cornersto ne to the committee's
success . They have identified the group who will bene fit from this exercise
and they have received recognition from the governmen t that they have
rights to the adjacent lobster resource.
The level of co-operation among the government agencies is evident from
the contributions each agency has made to the project at Eastport. It appears
that this initial co-mana gement effort has overcome the sociopolitical inter-
governme ntal conflict problem identified by Pinkerton and Weinstein
(1995). The compliance lenforcement problems and the exclus ion problems
identified by Pinkerton and Weinste in (1995) have also been addressed by
theELPe.
The Eastpo rt case study reflects "clearly defined boundaries " in which the
Eastport fishermen can fish, a design principal of Ostrom which was
previously discussed. Local conditions were a major consideration in
deciding which areas around Eastport were to be closed to fishing. Also
lobster fisherm en on the Peninsula have a collective-choice arrangement
whereby they can participate in modifying the operational rules. The
47
monitoring arrangement of the committee is performed by the fishermen
themselves who monitor appropriate behavior. Enforcement is handled by
DFO enforcement personnel who are partnered in the Joint Project
Agreement with the committee. Conflict resolution is carried out at local
and joint meetings with the fishermen, DFO and Park authorities. This is a
low cost conflict resolution mechanism which is both rapid and effective for
the relatively small group involved. It is unlikely that the situation with the
herring seine fishery in Nova Scotia will repeat itself in Eastport as the
committee has established itself as an authority through its support by
resident fishermen and the by the Joint Project Agreement.
The formulation of the Joint Project Agreement is a recognition of a right to
organize by the external government authority. the Minister of Fisheries and
Oceans. Nested enterprises have a role in this particular co-management
case study in that DFO is a large and multi-layered organization. Likewise
Eastport Peninsula fishermen are nested in the FFAW /CAW organization.
Yet both of these groups have organized their resources to SUppOI't the
initiatives of a small group of fishermen.
..
The Eastport Lobster Protection Committee works in close co-operation
with the Science Branch of DFO but the Enforcement Branch is respons ible
for ensuring that fishermen inside and outside of the Eastport Peninsula
abide by DFO regulations as well as rules specified in the agreemen t. The
support that the fishermen receive from DFO shows that the governmen t is
open to initiatives such as this one and recognizes the impact of such
initiatives on future generations. The efforts by DFO to initiate a logbook
data program in the local schools means that through example and through
education the next generation will inherit a sustainable lobster resource.
The signing of the Joint Project Agreement legitimizes the committee 's
existence from a legal standpoint; however the test will be in how the
government responds to challenges from outsiders to fish inside the
Eastport Peninsula boundaries.
The Eastport lobster fishermen have an avenue of flexible options for
dealing with the access problems to the resource. The option for other
fishermen on the peninsula to enter the lobster fishery reflects the same type
of inc1usion scenario as the l ofoten cod fishery. Too many fishermen in the
lobster fishery may not be a problem because there may be few new
"
fishermen to enter the fishery and other established fishermen may have no
interest in gearing up for a short season . If access problems develop it will
be interesting [0 sec: how they are resolved. Will DFO ignore the committee
and let license transfers occurinto Eastport or will DFO share its licensing
rights and let the jo int committee decide how to respond to local access
pressure, as described by Ostrom (1990) and Berkes et al.( 1989) . In the co-
management spirit can DFO work with the ELPC to implement access
options that are acceptable to local residents? Such options could include
limiting new licenses to retirements, matching licenses to effort or any
combination of options that local fishermen and government officials
decide are workable solutions . The Partnering Agreement allows for this
mechan ism but will it work under public local pressure?
Local knowledge as human capital is a tool we can use to co-manage
fisheries . In an interview with George Feltham lO, chairman of the ELPChe
made the following statement :
[f we can build up the stocksthen our income is going to
go up which is the bottom line. One of the reasons we
think this is working here:is that too often government
focuses on conservation or marine protected areas and
they can't identify who they arc protecting it for. And
fisher people especially in outer communities once
government agencies come in they get the feeling that
" lnterview recorded. withO. Felthun It sandy Cove.Bonavisu Bay, July 24, 1998.
governmentis not doing it for bim but is doing for the
tourist industry or for some person in Toronto with very
little benefit to the local person. What we've done is
we've put our focus on the community for our benefit
andour survival. This is why we get people to come on
side. We were giventhe informa tion we made our own
decisions we took the areas that we wanted to closeout
of the system and identified them as good lobster habitat
andafter that science came in andverified that.
The Eastpo rt Lobster Protection Committee incorporales local knowledge
into the implementation of its co-management agreement with DFO and
"getting people to come on side" is a measure of its success.
"
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APPENDIX II
Iff1
ME~IORANDUM OF AGREE~IENT
CONTA I:'IC'/G T HE T ER.\I S AND CONDITIO NS
BEnnEI'
THE DEPARIM£~T OF .·lSH£RJ.[S r\~O Ul.t:A~S (Of 0)
AND THE EASTPORT PENL"S UI.A LOBSTER F1SBER COM~OTTEE
(CO~L'OTTEE) FOR A PILOT PROJECT FOR TBE 1997 LOBSTER FISBERY
I.~
This Memorandum cf Agreement r.-IOA) outlines the terms. conditions and
responsibilities orOOm pames to this agreemem under which the 1991 lobster fishery in
the area referred to as the EASTPORT PE~SLrx..A LOBSTER \l~"lAGE~1ENT
AREA (EPLM.~) and as described in Annex I will be conducted.
The objective ar this pilot projectis to promote greater indusuy involvement into
decisions affecting:the management or the lobster fishery in the defined area which will
result in improved conservation anda mere stable fishery for the benefits of fishers and
their communities
2. '1:\~"GE"E~TCQMj\:1J1TEE
:2.1 A Managm ent Committee shallbe formed by the Parties to oversee the
management and administration of the pilot project. The Mana~ement Commineeshall
consist of:
I ) DFO
Am Manag:er - Eastern and Southern (Co-Chair)
ARa Chief: C &; P. Eastern
StaffOflicer- Fishery and Policy Innovation
one ScienceRepresentativ.e
b) COMMITTEE
Chairman - l obster Committee (Co-Chair)
a ma.'timum of 6 lobster licence holden residing within the EPlMA
2.2 The ~ lanagem~nt Commineemay call upon suchother persons for assistance as it
considersnecessary
2.3 The :-"Ianagement Ccmrmneeshall meet at leastonceduring the period April I.
1997 to \ Iarch 3I, 1998
2.4 The ~(anagement Committeewill develop a WorkPlan(AJ.~X U) for the 1997
lobster fisheryspecifying the activities to be undertakenand the responsibilities of tach
Party and monitors the progress and performancecf both Parties
J . PUBLICATION
3.1 Subject to the Accessto Information and Privacy Act. Project data and any other
Project related information shall be freely availableto bothPartiesand may be used,
disseminatedor published by either Puty , at any time.Any material which is to be
published by either Party shallbe provided to the otherPartyprior to public
dissemination.
3.2 Each Party shall retain theright to have the nameof any of its employeesor
members who may have beeninvolved in specific scientificprojects, analysis or report
writing. namedas a co-author of any scientific pobllenionresulting therefrom.
This Agreement shall come into forceon the date on whichit is signed by both Parties
andshall remain in force untilMarch 3I. 1998. unlessterminated sooner in accordance
withClauses.
S. TER~rtNATION
5.1 This Agreementmay be terminated by either Partyby giving writtennotice 30days
in advance to the other Partyor at any time with the consentof both Patties
6. ENTIRE AGR EEMENT
The terms.conditionsand responsibilities herein. togetherwith A.'tN'EX t and At.'lNEX
n form the entire agreementof the Partieswith respectto this Project
ANNExn
WORKPLAN
PART I· DFO
A. MANAGEMENT ANDCONSERVATlON
l . LicenceandConditions
• Issue lobster licence and vessel regisuation(s)
- Prepare and distribute lobster ccediticns to all Lobster Fishing Area Slicence holden
establishing the Eastpon Peninsula Lobster ManagementArea(EPLMA) l.Ild
• resuicting accessto the inner portion of the EPLMA to tishen identified in
Schedule I
• muicting access to mat portionof l obster Fishing AreaS outside the EPL\ t-\ to all
holdersof lobster licencesfor IF A 5 not identifiedin Schedule I.
2. Variation Orders
- Prepare and announcevariation orders closing the two areasoutlinedin Schedule Il
referred to as Roundbland Closed Area and Duck £Sland ClosedAreato lobsterfishing.
3. Trap Tags
- Purchase and distribute tri p tags to all lobster fishers in LFA 5
4. Conservation and Protection Activities
• Promoteconservation andprotection activities in the area.
• Cc-crdinaseandplanland .l.l1Qsea surveillaace <1.~ti...ides in ace.! around tho: E;L~L\ in
ccnsultadcn with theCvrnmi:::::
s. Data Collection
• Prepareand distribulc the data collectionsheets to flShers identified in Scbedulc I
6. Managementand Administration
- Monitor the rish.ery in ,!!:c::.cr...i
- Consult and p.an:icipate in the co-management process
7, Policy and Economics
- Have the optionto conduct~OS I and earnings survey~ with local flsbers
_ Monitor the annual fishing revenues from lobster and other species
_ Monitor the economic performance 0 :' the group.
B. SCIENCE
- Establish the data cctlecncn requirem ::Its for scientific purposes including theformat
of data collection sheets
_ Monitor the performance andcharacte sties oClhe fishery
• Conduct timely consultationwiththe : bster fisher's committee
_ Distribute scientificinformation and ' -ld meetings with the lobster fisher's committee
_ Maintain contact with the lobster fish :-'s committee and encourageinput fromfishers
regarding catch experience.a.:lother kr; ~wledge regarding lobster stocks
• whe never possible, train md educate .lsbers about lobster biolosy, statisticaland
measuring techniques so thal lishm ma participate in da11 ccllecuce a.Cld studies to
enhance me knowledge aOQl.ll lobster ar..; to ensure respcesib le co- Cllll..agemlmt •
decisions.
PART(J • COMMITTEE
Management and Conservation
_ Conduct consultationand.:onCmn support oCthe ocighboringlo bstc:r ruben to me
EPLMA Corthis pilol project
• Assist in developingthe physicaldescription oruieEPLMA. including the mner and
outer sections
- ASSISt In developingthe physicaldescriptionof Ihe tWO areas to be closed 10 ail iocster
fishing.
- Assist, as required, in thedistribution of tags
- Consult and participate in theco-managementprocess
• Promoteconservation and protection activities andstewardshipof the resource with
fishers inside andoutside the EPL~tA_ . .
• Encourage fishers to report ant incidents of illegalactivity eitherobserved or reponed
Science
- Encourage fishersto complete and make accurateentries in the logsheets providedby
Of 0
• Be responsible for the collection and safe-keeping of the log sheetsat the endof the
lobster fishinl:season
- Inform fishersof the imponance of reportingto DFO any significantobservations
concerningthe biology and exploitation of the lobster
- Organize information sessionsfor presentation cf'projecrrelated information by the
OFO.
In witnesswhereofthe Parties hereto haveexecutedthis Agreementby their authorized
representatives:
~b~~
LOBSTER CO~l\DTTEE
a!ad<J..=
/ Witness
SCHEDULE I
LIST OF FISHERS PER.'OTTED TO fiSH
L'lTHE INNER PORTIO N
OF THE EPL\ L\
f L'l
549100103
1660 10801
16007170 1
147012801
1180J:00 1
5530 111 03
560102701
11904300 1
SS~ 12030J
1161 12102
527061501
552041703
542073101
55308 1302
554082802
556020404
510 1: 030 1
5~71 2290 1
555081 903
1400Sl ool
55305( 702
542010:04
559071601
55508 1903
5291006004
558080302
533120301
54304040 1
550032002
552110702
526 l11902
560012302
SUR'lAME
BADSTOCK
BALSOM
BROWN
BROWN'
BROWN
BROWN
BURDEN
BURDEN
BURRY
BllTT
DURDLE
DYKE
ELLIOTT
ELLIOTT
suorrr
suorrr
ESTPOIVELL
fElTHA.'"
fEllJlAl,l
IW.LETT
HANCOCK
HEffiRN
HEFFERN
HUNTER
HUNTER
J"""£5
JOHNSON
KING
LANE
LANE
LANE
MERCER
FIRSTNAME
~L\C
MICHAEL Wll.LL\.\1
ANDY
CALYIN NEVll.LE
ROBERT
wn. LL<\M JOSEPH
CARSON
WAYNEBERTRA\I
LLOYDJ
ALBERT J
ALLISTER
HARRlSONRG
ALFREDJ
DAVIDHAROLD
RICHARD
VICTOR
LAWRENCE
CHARLESH
GEORGE
ALBERT
KEVIN
ALLISTER
GEOFFREY
BRIANDONALD
JOHNS
GORDON
LEWIS
LEONARD
BROCK
KENNETH
LAWRENCE REG~.\.LD
WlLLLAM
5510111 01 ~IOS S HOWAJU] I
540090802 MOSS RONALD
S.-lu llvv i OLDf u RD Ci..i.FFORD E
543110903 OLDFORD GERALDT
56111 0501 PENNEY CRAlGT
557021804 PENNEY ROGERWILLL...."!
565\21603 PIKE PAUL
5SS0907C: PA\~.1:: RALPH
535110201 RALPH ALBERTCLAL'DE
539020201 RALPH ANTHONYW
559060803 RALPH BRUCE W
559122601 RALPH DERlUCK
55408010 1 ROGERS JOHN
55806 1702 SQIIlRE BONNELL
562081401 SQIIlRE BOYD NATHAN
5550 10801 SQL1RES W!:'lSTON
555020801 TURNER WADE W
ANNEXl
The Eastport Peninsula Lobster Management Area (EPLMA)is described as thatarea
inside a line bounded by a seriesof'straight lines commencing at Bloody Bay Point to
South East sideof :-'Ianin Shepherd's Islandto Point of SalvegemensHarbour on Willis
Island to Nonh Point. Willis [sland to 48 degrees 4S'IS" N latitude, 53 degrees3S' SO" W
longitude [0 -48 degrees·W OO" N latitude, S3degrees )2'36" W longitude to ~s degrees
34' 06" N latitude. 53degrees 34'36 " W longitude to Southem Point of Eric 's Head,
Ncwmans Sound.
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JOI~T PROJECT ,-,C R£H I£:"T
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WHEREAS lbe Minisler andtbe .woei:ation{'" the PMtiesj wish coundcrtU:e I joiolFfOjeato
efficiendy mana~e dle 10bSlUfisheryin the E~cport Peninsula Lobsler ~1&l'1a lemenl Atn ( .. the
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1.1 This projectisdcscnbed. inSchedule 8 hemo. The responsibilities or exb hrty wid'!rnpea: co
me Ptojec1~ dacnbed ind'IcAMu.a1Work PI&n.allJdled.as Schedule C. which lIlail be ~iKd
each:-arin K'ConbDccwittl C1a\ISC 1. 1.
1.1 t.ipoa!he caminl inco~c orchis Avc:ment, .1Manaleme:'llCommLl::e:~ be rormed!l'l"ee
Pwes to ovcnn lbc1lI1ol1.qem enl o r this Project. The~a'ClMnt CommJ~ ItWI eonsisl:of.
Am ~llll:alu. E~em IIld Southern (co-e halr)
Are:1Oi c!. COIUCfVll ion and Protection, E;uccm U\dSoIlllem
SQtrOffic:r. Fbhcry and Po l i~ InnoV1olion
one Scimct Rcpraenlalivc
b) Repm'5'i'tln"a o(tbf Associanon :
Ch&imIm.~ LoblccrCommittu ( co-chair)
Ama:timwnor 6 lobster ueeeee holden~idinl ...idliJl lht EPL\tA
OrIe~wM: o(the FFA W CA.W Fisht mwl ' l llltSO\Re Cenln.
The M.1II<lcme:n Cornmtttte m~y e;lll u~on 'lie !'!oll'ler penon s for :w iSUl1Ce <ISit COlIsid~
n«esury.
o"nnlltle (emoftl'lls " Irt emenl. t!'Ie :'.llII.lle mtn l CommIttee dU ll mu r ~ Ie»! OlIee ltl exft
pen04 l'\lMiIl aom A.pnl llO ~U<:ft j I l-lhe rl$nl ~ut1.
,.
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b) monitorsthe provm lIId per:onn ll'lce of the P1nles under:h e " MUa! Wort Plan.
ORtIC"n ONS OF'THE ..,INISTER
.&.1 Once each AM.UJJ Wort P!<In Iw eeee acc:eplC\1 and , ipC\1 by the Putie:s. the mponsibilieesof
the MinislCl'lS iwniw! mm in, Iall be bindinl upon the ~inism' fot!lul fiscl yt'3l' .
OBltC" no... s OF'mE ....SSOCJ"TION'
5.1 Once u eh AnnualWori:P!<In hu be~ <leeeplC\1 and si9l N by che P1rtie:s.the raponslbilitiC5 of
the Association1Sitemized therein shall be bindini upon the ASlIoci.lrionfor mal fisaI yev.
.... upml'ic "~\'IOl'iITORI:'\IG
6.1 The ~in isle:".lnd:tlc Assoc:anon <lJue to m&inuin books.~ords. cIoo.uncnlS. md ochermatmal
pCl'Ulnial lOltIiI.' pmCl'lt. R«ords Uld documenwion wll be mained by each PIny fot&
period orthtce {j) ~can &t'ter'jje tenn U'l&tionordl is Apttmenl for wlluc~Cfrnson.. Boch?Wes
alf« thai all~ pm;aiaial to Ibis p,,;,Jed shall be motde<lnilable, flibjtct:a !beptOYGi0rt5 or
tile Access 10 lnfcrm.ation iIIldPnYKYAas. to the omet Pal1yfOf' venficuio n Md wd.iIUpDft
R'q \lCSI.
7.1 fo r:h e \f inim r:
' J " ,u Manlirr
Euttm Illd Southern
U~ CtO$bie Roa.d
51. John·s" NfId..
A.IB iiO
Phone (709) m-JO lO
Fax{i 09)- m ·1659
b) SCienlirlCAut!'tOrit)/: Se~tion Head -She llfish
NAFC
P.O. Box 5667
St.lohn · s. ~tld.
A IC.s XI
Phono= (j'09)i";"~ -1094
F:l.'t ('~09)ii2-HO ;:
Chairman
Ea.s:pon Lobner Ccmminee
C'O FFAW/CA W Fishermen's Resourceceaee
P. O. Box.1::42, Sa\C
:2seeersccve
SL John 's. Nfld .
AIC :5M9
Phone (j' 09) 6i7·26 10
F:l.'t (i 09)6 i 7· 26ll
8.~
8.•1 Subject 10 theAcc~ to lnfonn&lion and Privacy Act. Project dm. andmy odlerProjectreliUCd
information shall bemly available to both PaJ1iesand may be used,disscminlled or published
by eimer P1rty.U.lJly time. Any mlleria l which is to be pUblished by eimerPtny shall be
provided to theocberP3l'typnort o public;dis.semination.
8..2 Eac;!'I~wJlrel3intherisht lO tlavethenameofJtlyof itsemproY«SOl'membel'S ....t1omay
have been involved inspecificscientific;j:lrojec:a. analysisor ~rt writins. namedIS a co-audlor
of any scientific publ iarion multin l the~ftom.
9. CO;\o1T:"'C INTO FORq: A:'I'Dn:R"1
9.1 This Asrtemcnlsl\allcome intoforte on tho= dale on wtlichilhas bccnueculedbybo1llParties
and.other dian St."IedIIle C, sl\aJlremAin in forc;cWlcil31 Man:h.,200l .
10. TERYlIN"nON
10.1 ThisA~mentmaybe terminaledat any lime wid!.the consc:nt ofbolh Parties.
10 .2 Tenn~rion for C1ll$t :
11 The Anoc i.1non mi l" rtnn inate thi s Alrte menr. upon "'ritten norice to lhe ~l in ister:
[) i f lhc Minis!er brelCht1 the te~s orcond i fion s o i lh, s Al rcemenf.
b) The ~Iilus:er ml y tennina re th is ." I reemenr. upon \OM en notice to the ."-socWion.:
I) if ttle M SOCiarion bfex hts the femuorctltld iriOft sof rtlisAlfftm etl~
ial if dle Associl tion is blllkllJ pr. files for buWuprcy. or is involvl:d in JQ)'" t-knlp1Cl"
procttd inl ;o r
iii) if the :'dinurtf , in llis or her opin ion. is uuble 10 M fiIllh eob lil ationsUllderdlis
AgrecmenL
I I. EVP'TS VPO' '' J[ R~I :''(''TtQN
1\ .\ Uponremlin1fiooofthe A~emenr. thefo l1o....inlshalllX cur:
I l the Minister slWImik e availl ble to lhe Assoc il lion m l" and III dm. rcpotU or 1Il1l~
l eMnted purwIIlf to this Agcem~n t.
12. .I:!Q!Jg
12.1 AllYnotice undcrdlis A~ent sh.all be in ....riting Uld sllall be addn:u fa the appnlptWl! P2rty
as follows:
Arn Man.atct
Fisbcrie:san4 Ocans
Eutcm llld Soutbcm
D6 Crosbie Road
St.lohn's"Nnd..
AIB l lO
Ch"""'"
EutpOt'!lobster Committee
CO FFAW;CAWFishermen's gescceee ceeee
P. O.BoI124 t.Sln C
2 StttrsC ove
5c. Jobn' s,,:olnd..
A lC 5M9
u . DfSPl 'TE RESOL UTION
I j . 1 ....llere 3 dispute IS10 th~ inlerprtt.1tion o rthis Agreemenl or or mltttl'1 rel:lill; 10iesttml inl1iOll.
oro fptn·onnance hereunder.th e Put it s sh3J13ttempl ingoodf3iUl loresolvtth edisputtth rou;f!
netoli3tion. Should nt;oli,uion prove wUl.lccessfuL Ule P;uun shIll submiltht mIner to 1
IJ\UN111)lKcept:lble third part)!(or medi3tion. The ecus or the mediation shIll bedivided eQ,u311)1
belW«nthe P:1Mies.
I~ .I Neithtrthe Anoc iujon nor any ories pel'tOMel or 3gencsis 3n employee. sel"<31uor , cenl orme
Minisrer or of Her M3jesty and sh311 not hold themselvesout tel be so. The Association is llone
responsiblelll d lil ille ror .1oll Cll im.s.demands , losses, ccse.deeu, Ictions. d.un1SCl,sui tsor other
p~e:tIiinp brought 19ainst it inany way arising out or or l rtribuable 10 iesobliSll ioll$under dlis
·-\v=ent.
1$. HOl:SE OrCOM:'olONS
15.1 No memberof the Houseof Commons shal l be admitted 10 oVl y sh.lreofmis .-\gre: mento r to oVl)l
btnefitwinghercfr'om.
16. prBlIC SERV."xrS
16.1 A penon or (ormer public:stl"<ant or publ ic office holder who isnot in c:ompliance with the
lppliable provisionsof the Conflict or 'n( eten Uld Pop-EmplOYment Code for Public:Office
~OI' theConffiet o(tnftTeS~ and Post -EmplovmenrCode for the Public: Xl"<ice$hIli not
eenve1 dirccl btnefit fromthis AgreemenL
[7 . ."PPliCABLE LAW
17.1 The law ineffect in the Provinc:e or:-.rewfo undland ltld tab~cot shalllppl y tel the interpretacion
iUtd idministr'llionof mis Ave emenL
IS E:qIR E _"' CR E ~ ."I En
IS I The terms ¥Id condilions herein, tol ether with Schedule A. ~hedule B. ItId with Schedule C,IS
ml ended .1II/I1I.llIy, rorm the entire "ITee:nen[ orthe P;uties \Vimf1!spec[ to tllis projeoct.
L..... W IT:"iESS WHER!OF the PJrties hereto ha" U tc lllN this "Irttmen[ by theireu~
fe pmftlCWvn.
Witness
WilntsS
WilntsS
For the Minul erof Fishtri es wQl; i!:I.lIS
0".
Dale
FF" WtCAW Fishermen ' s Rescurt: Cltllln
SCHEDULE A
The Easrpon Peninsub. Lobster Man.agem~nt Area lE P L~L~) is describedas that area
inside a line bounded b:-- 3. series of straight tines commencinr at Bloody Bay Point to
South East side of :\futin Shepherd's Island to Point o(Salvagcmens Harbcur oe Willis
Island tc North Point, Willis Islandto -lSdegrees .&S' IS" N latitude. 53 degrees3S'SO" W
longirudc to -l8degrees ..«1 '00" N latiNde. S3degrees 32'36" Wlongitude to 48degrees
34' 06" N latirude. 53 degrees j..I'j6" W longitude to Southern Point cf Eric's Head.
NcwmansSOWld.
The inner ponion of the EPl~lA isdescribed as that area inside a line bounded bya
series of straight linescommencing at North Point of littl e Harbour in Swale Tickle,
Ncwtna.ll Scund to ~8 40' OO'"Nlatitude, 53 j2' 36"W longitudc IO48 .&S '40"'N latitude.
S3 4 1'j6"'"WlongiCJdc to Purgatory (Pw:lwory ) Head Fait and False Bay.
SCH EDULE B
PROJ ECT DESCRIPTION
During the past few yc3IS.fishersfrom the E.u tport area have been 3Cthdy patticipating.
on a voluntarybasis,in the management aCthe lobster fishery- in their traditiccallcbster
fishing waters.
The main objective wasto eebaace me lobster resource in this areabypromotingand
implementing sustainable b.a.rvcstingpractices and assisti.ag in the plan.c.ingof
conservation and pro~on activities.
During 1991. a pilot project was implemented between the fishers and Of 0 [0 further
build on these initiati'ves. Thework.of the fishers o·..er thepastfewyears havealready
shown signs of lmpro'°edcccservaticn measures in the area.
This project isdesignedto continue this wo rk over the cee five yean in order to manage
the lobster fisheryina coo perative relationship based on the principlesof conservation
andenvironmenw susuinabwty .
The activities and m poasibilitiesofb olb parties will be defined in the Annual Work Plan
{Schedule C}
SCHEDULEC
A!';l'olJAL WORK PL.-\o....
1998 /1999
PART [ • The Minister
A. I-L-\o'iAGEMENT AND COr-;SERVAn ON
1. Licence and Conditions
Prepare and disttibute lobster conditions 10 all l obster Fishing.~3. ( lfA) :S licence
holders esu blishing the EasrportPeninsula Lobster Management Area ( -the
EPL'L~·') and
• restrie:ticgaccess to theinner portion oCme EPlM.-\ to fishers identified in
Schedule Dof thcAnnual WorlePlan.
o mtricting access to that portionof l obster Fishing .AteaS outside the EPlM.~ to
all holders of lobster licences for lFA:5 not identified in Schedule 0 aCme Annual
WorkPlan.
2. Variation Orders
• Pfq)at'C and announcevariation orders closing the twO areasoutlined in Schedule Eof
the Annual Work Planreferred to as RoundIsland ClosedArea and Duck Island
Closed Area to lobster fushing.
3. Trap Tags
• Purclwe anddistnbutc aap tagsto all lobster fishers in lF A .)
4. Conservation and Protection Acti vities
Promote conservationand protection.activi ties ....ith fishers within the projectand the
SUlTOuoding areas .
C~tdinate andplat!. land aDdsea.surveillaaeeactivities in and around me EPL\ofA in
consultation withm~ ."-ssoc:iation..
10
5. Data Collection
• Prepare: and distribute The d.:l~ collection sheets to tishe~ idenlitied in Schedule 0 of
the Annual WorkPtu.
6. Management and Administration
MonitOretches 3.Od. the fishery in general
On a regularbasis consultand participate in the co-management process
7. Policy andEconomics
Have the optionto conduct COSt and earnings surveys with local fishers
Monitor the annual fishingrevenues from lobster and other species
Monitor the economic perfonnanc=.of the group.
B. SCIBICE
Establish thedata.collection requirements for scientific purposesintludingthe format
of data ccllect icesheets
Monitor the perform.anc:e and characteristics of the fisherythtouih IOjbooks and at
~sampling
Monitor scit otitie \\o'orkecoducted by outside agencies withinthe EPLMJ... i.e.
lobster tag:ging:. jU"enilc lobster sampling, post-larvasettlemeQtsurveys.
Conducttimely consultation with the Eastport lobster fisher'scommittee
Disaibutc scientific information and hold meetings wilh the lobsterflsher's
committee
Maintaincontact \\i lh the Eastport lobster fisher's committee and encourageinput
from flshers regardingcatch experience and other knowledge regarding lobSlerstocb
whenever possible. min and educate fishers about lobster biology, statistical and
measuring tei:hniques so that fishers may participate in data colJec:tion and studies to
enhance the knowledgeabout lobster and to ensure responsible C(). management
decisions.
"P.-\..RT [I • The Association
A. Management and Conservation
ConductfurthercOl'1Suhation and confi rm support of the neigbbcring lobsterfishersas
the project progresses.
Assist in developingthe physical description of the E PtM.~. induding theinnerand
outer sections
Assist in developingthe physicaldescription of the tv.-o areasto beclosed toall
lobster tishing.
Assist. as requited. in the distribution of tags
Consultand participate in the co-management process
Promote conservation and protectionactivities and stewardship of theresource \\i th
fishers inside andoutside the EPl~t-\.
Act as an advocateof lobster censer-varion throughout the Newfoundland Region.
Encourage fishersto reportany incidents of illegal activityeither observed or reponed
B. Science
Encourageand. wherenecessary. assist fishers to make complete andaccurate entries
in the log sheets provided by OFO
Be responsible for the collection and safe-keeping of the log sheetsat theendof the
lobster fishingseason
Be responsible forthe data entryof all information collectedon the logsheets.
Infonn fishersof the importance of repcrcng to DFO any significant cbservacoes
concerningthe biologyand exploitation of the lobster
Organizeinfonnation sessions for presentation of projectrelatedinformation bythe
~{jnister.
Provide assistance, whenrequired, in all scientific work conductedwithinthe
EPt~, Le. lobster tagging, juvenile lobster sampling, post-larva sealement surveys,
Conduct v-notching of female lobsters at a level acceptableto both parties.
FP.I
"
SCHED~"l.E D
LISTOF FISHERS PER\IlTTED TO FISH
INTHE 1:o.';ER PORTION
OF THE EPL.\lA
FIRSTNAME
5..l9 100103
5660 10801
56007\10 1
547052801
558032001
553012203
56010210 1
559043001
554120303
556112102
521061501
552041103
542073101
SS308D02
554082802
5560204C4
510120301
547122901
55508190:;
540053001
553051702
542070204
559011601
55508190;
529100604
558080;02
533120.301
543040401
.;;0032002
552110702
526111902
BADSTOCK
BALSOM
BRO\VN
BROWN
BROw:-l
BROw:-l
B~lU)EN
B~lU)EN
BURRY
BUTT
DURDLE
DYKE
ELLIOTT
ELLIOTT
ELLOITT
ELLOITT
ESTPOViElL
FELTHAI,(
FELTHAM
HALLETT
HANCOCK
HEFFER.'l
HEFFERN
HUNTIR
HUNTIR
lANES
lOHNSON
KING
L"'~"E
lA.'lE
L"''E
~l'C
~UCH.~L "'llLlA.\1
" .'lDY
CALVINNEVILLE
ROBERT
"'llLlAM IOSEPH
CARSON
WAY:'<"EBERTRAM
LLOYDl
ALBERT I
ALLISTER
HARJUSONRG
ALFRED I
OAV1D HAROLD
RJCH.UD
VICTO R
L' WRENCE
CllARLESH
GEORGE
ALBERT
KEVIN
ALLISTER
GEOFFREY
BRl.-\-'lO ONALO
lOHNS
GORDON
LEWIS
LEONARD
BROCK
~"ETH
LAWRENCEREGINALD
560012302
551013101
5~0090S02
5~ 1 01 :!00 1
543t 10903
;61 110; 01
557021804
565122603
558090702
535t t0201
539020201
559060803
559122601
55408010t
55806t702
;62 081401
5550t080t
555020802
MERCER
MOSS
MOSS
OLDFORD
OLDFORD
PENNEY
PENNEY
PIKE
PAYNE
RALPH
RALPH
RALPH
RALPH
ROGERS
SQUIRE
SQUIRE
SQUIRES
TURNER
"
WILLIAM
HOWARDJ
RONALD
CLIFFORD E
GERALD T
CRAIG T
ROGER WILLIAM
PAUL
RALPH
ALBERTCLAlJDE
Al-lTHONYW
BRUCE W
DERRlCK
JOHN
BONNEll
BOYD NATIL....'!
WINSTON
WADEW
SCHEDULEE
A~NUAL \\,'ORK PLAN
DESCRJPTlONOF AREAS"HID:" THE EPL~lA CLOSEDTO ALL
LOBSTER FlSHI:"G.
A) ROliND ISLA.~1J CLOSED AREA
That portionof lobster fishing area 5 wi thin 650 feetcf the shore of RoundIsland.
S e.....manSouad., Sonama Bay.
B) Dl.!CKISLA.'ID CLOSEDAREA
That portionof lobsterfishing area 5 bounded by astraight linejoining the
followingpointSintheorderin which they arelisted:
48 -1-1 ' 30;'; 53 42' OOW
484j 'S-l '"N 534 1" l8"W
48+.$' 30"'N 5340' 42''W
4845' 06"N 534t ' 18"W
4840$' 30"'N 53 42' 06""W




